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From inference to reasoning: 
The construction of rationality
David Moshman 
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Inference is elementary and ubiquitous: Cognition always goes beyond 
the data. Thinking—including problem solving, decision making, judgment, 
planning, and argumentation—is here defi ned as the deliberate application 
and coordination of one’s inferences to serve one’s purposes. Reasoning, in 
turn, is epistemologically self-constrained thinking in which the application 
and coordination of inferences is guided by a metacognitive commitment to 
what are deemed to be justifi able inferential norms. The construction of ra-
tionality, in this view, involves increasing consciousness and control of logi-
cal and other inferences. This metacognitive conception of rationality begins 
with logic rather than ending with it, and allows for developmental progress 
without positing a state of maturity. 
For Piaget, cognitive development was, at its core, the development of logi-
cality, culminating in the formal operational logic that emerges in early adoles-
cence (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). Piaget’s theory of formal operations has been 
challenged by the results from two major bodies of literature. One, the early 
competence literature, purports to show that, contrary to Piaget, even preschool 
children are fundamentally logical. The other, the adult irrationality literature, 
purports to show that, contrary to Piaget, even adults are at best nonlogical, if not 
fundamentally illogical and thus irrational. If these literatures challenge Piaget’s 
conception of formal operations, however, they seem to pose an equally serious 
challenge to each other. If preschool children are so logical, how could adults be 
so illogical? 
The short answer, I think, is that logical inference is routine even among pre-
school children, but that logical reasoning, as I will defi ne it in this article, con-
tinues to develop for many more years and remains imperfect even in adults. 
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More generally, we will see how preschool logic and adult nonlogicality are 
consistent with each other and with developmental conceptions of progress in 
rationality. 
LOGIC AND RATIONALITY
Is rationality nothing more than logic? According to Bickhard and Campbell 
(1996, pp. 400–401): 
[W]hatever the merits of a ‘mental logic’ account of specifi c kinds of thinking at 
specifi c points in human development, it can’t be telling the whole story about hu-
man reasoning. When broader historical and developmental trends are taken into 
account, it becomes clear why rationality cannot be simply assimilated to logi-
cality. A system of formal logic already contains all of its valid theorems. Log-
ical systems don’t grow or become more powerful. Logical systems can’t con-
struct new logical systems more powerful than themselves. Yet the history of 
logic shows that human knowledge of logic and logical systems has developed 
(Bochenski 1970, Kneale and Kneale 1986) and that more and more powerful 
systems of logic have been discovered. If rationality simply means following the 
rules contained within a particular logical system, then the history of logic can’t 
be rational! 
Similarly, if being rational means being logical, the development of each indi-
vidual’s knowledge of logic can’t be a rational process either . . . 
Consistent with this view of rationality as something more than logic, developmen-
tal research indicates that a conception of rationality as logical inference would 
greatly overestimate the rationality of young children and greatly underestimate 
the extent of ongoing development in reasoning. In a series of two experiments, 
for example, Pillow (2002) presented a total of 112 children, ranging in age from 
5 through 10 years, with a series of inference tasks, including a deduction task in 
which they saw two toys of different colors, which were then hidden in two cans. 
After looking into one of the cans they were asked about the color of the toy in the 
other can. Every child, regardless of age, inferred the color correctly. 
This result was no surprise to Pillow, whose concern was the development of 
metalogical understanding about deductive inferences (see below). In fact there 
is substantial evidence that preschool children routinely make deductive infer-
ences (Braine & O’Brien, 1998; Hawkins, Pea, Glick, & Scribner, 1984; Schol-
nick & Wing, 1995) and that even the behavior patterns of infants show an in-
creasingly coordinated sensorimotor logic (Langer, 1980, 1986). 
But even if there is a sense in which the behavior of an infant is in accord with 
strict rules of logic, the infant is not aware of that logic. Similarly, when pre-
school children reach correct conclusions, they don’t even know they have made 
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an inference, much less know anything about the nature, purpose, or justifi ability 
of that inference. As we will see below, what develops beyond early childhood is 
not the basic ability to make logical inferences, but metalogical knowledge about 
the nature and justifi ability of logical inferences, and metacognitive awareness, 
knowledge, and control of one’s inferential processes. 
If by rationality we mean conformity to rules of logic, then even preschool 
children are substantially rational in their inferential processes. If by rational-
ity we mean metacognitive awareness, knowledge, and control of inferential pro-
cesses, however, then rationality develops over a period of many years that of-
ten extends well beyond childhood without ever attaining a defi nitive state of 
maturity (Kuhn, 2000; Moshman, 1994). Such a conception does not deny an 
important role for logic but goes beyond logic in two ways. First, even within 
the logical domain, a metacognitive conception of rationality locates rationality 
in metalogical understanding and control rather than in logic per se. Second, a 
metacognitive conception acknowledges that rationality may develop through re-
fl ection on and coordination of heuristics and norms more subtle than the rules of 
formal logic. As we will see, this conception helps us understand how progress 
towards rationality is consistent with both logical competence in young children 
and inferential diversity among adults. 
INFERENCE, THINKING, AND REASONING
Inference—going beyond the data—is elementary and ubiquitous. By the end 
of their fi rst year, if not long before, infants infer what they will see from what 
they hear, and vice versa, infer the locations of objects from partial information, 
and infer people’s emotions from their facial expressions. The uses of inference 
continue and expand with age. In reading and conversation we make inferences 
about meaning. In planning we make inferences about the future. In remember-
ing we make inferences about the past. Cognition, in all its forms, is inferential. 
Thinking is the deliberate application and coordination of one’s inferences to 
serve one’s purposes (Moshman, 1995, in press-a). We see this in problem solv-
ing, decision making, judgment, planning, argumentation, and other self-con-
sciously inferential activities. What all of these have in common is metacogni-
tion, broadly construed to encompass “the achievement of increasing awareness, 
understanding, and control of one’s own cognitive functions, as well as aware-
ness and understanding of these functions as they occur in others” (Kuhn, 2000, 
p. 320). With the development of metacognition over the course of childhood and 
beyond, there is progress in the quality of our thinking, although this is not a mat-
ter of approaching some mature state of perfect thinking (Klaczynski, in press). 
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Reasoning is epistemically self-constrained thinking (Moshman, 1995, in 
press-a). When thinkers constrain their inferences with the intent of conform-
ing to what they deem to be appropriate inferential norms, they can be said to be 
reasoning. Reasoning, then, requires epistemic cognition—knowledge about the 
fundamental nature and justifi ability of knowledge and inference. 
Epistemic cognition has been the topic of substantial research and theory in 
developmental and educational psychology for the past several decades (Chan-
dler, Hallett, & Sokol, 2002; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, 2002; King & Kitchener, 
1994; Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000). Epistemic development, it turns out, 
begins early and has a long history. Even preschool children, at least by age 4, 
understand that people lacking information may have, and act on the basis of, 
false beliefs (Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 2002; Mitchell & Riggs, 2000). Over the 
course of childhood, recognizing the inferential nature of their own cognitive 
processes, they construct a constructivist theory of mind. By late childhood, chil-
dren understand that they are active constructors of knowledge (Chandler et al., 
2002; Kuhn, 2000). 
Although preadolescents are aware of, and have explanations for, differing 
interpretations in particular cases, they do not theorize about the nature, limits, 
and justifi cation of knowledge in the abstract. Adolescents and adults, however, 
construct explicit epistemologies (Chandler et al., 2002; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, 
2002; King & Kitchener, 1994; Kuhn et al., 2000). The fi rst to appear, and one 
common among adolescents and adults of all ages, is an objectivist epistemol-
ogy, in which ultimate truth is deemed to be directly observable, provable, and/
or known to the authorities. Differences of opinion can only be the result of mis-
takes. Recognizing the intrinsic subjectivity of knowledge, however, some peo-
ple construct subjectivist epistemologies, in which truth, which is constructed 
from individual and/or cultural perspectives, is deemed to be determined by, and 
thus relative to, such perspectives. Finally, recognizing the nihilistic and self-re-
futing nature of radical subjectivism, some people construct rationalist episte-
mologies that, without any claim to absolute or fi nal truth, posit that ideas and 
viewpoints can be meaningfully evaluated, criticized, and justifi ed. 
Any epistemology provides a basis for reasoning—for deliberately constrain-
ing one’s inferential processes in the name of truth. Rationalist epistemologies 
presumably support better reasoning than objectivist or subjectivist epistemolo-
gies, but there are many rationalist epistemologies, many forms of advanced rea-
soning, and many bases for error and misjudgment. Thus development proceeds 
from inference to thinking to reasoning, but these are not stages in any simple 
sense. Thinking and reasoning develop throughout childhood and often well be-
yond, and there is always room for greater consciousness of how one is making 
one’s inferences and why. 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
METALOGICAL UNDERSTANDING
As we have seen, there are a wide variety of justifi able inferences, providing a 
basis for broad conceptions of thinking, reasoning, and rationality that go far be-
yond the realm of logic. It seems clear, however, that logical inferences are, in 
some circumstances, among those that can be most convincingly justifi ed, and 
that knowledge about the nature and use of such inferences is thus an important 
basis for reasoning. In this section we narrow our focus to consider an important 
aspect of epistemic development—the development of metalogical understand-
ing (Moshman, 1990). 
Metalogical understanding—conceptual knowledge about logic—includes (1) 
awareness of inference as a process that generates conclusions from premises; (2) 
understanding that some inferences are better than others; (3) knowledge about 
the logical properties of propositions, inferences, and arguments; and (4) con-
ceptualizations of logic as an epistemic domain. Let us consider each of these in 
turn, beginning with awareness of inference and of the associated distinction be-
tween premises and conclusions. 
People of all ages routinely construct structures of knowledge that include, 
but go beyond, available facts. This is a long-standing truism of cognitive psy-
chology (Jenkins, 1974), and there is no doubt that it holds for children (Beal, 
1990; Flavell et al., 2002). In reading a text, for example, readers make infer-
ences as they read, such that textual information and associated inferences are in-
tertwined, often inextricably, in the resulting mental representation. Having read 
that Alphaville is north of Boomtown, and that Boomtown is north of Metropolis, 
a reader may construct a mental representation of Alphaville north of Boomtown 
north of Metropolis and read off that Alphaville is north of Metropolis. From an 
external perspective we may observe that “Alphaville is north of Metropolis” is a 
conclusion inferred from “Alphaville is north of Boomtown” and “Boomtown is 
north of Metropolis”. From the perspective of the reader, however, these are sim-
ply three facts that can be read off the mental representation constructed in the 
course of processing the text. There is often no need to distinguish conclusions 
from premises, and no awareness of the inferential processes that have generated 
the former from the latter. 
Even when adults are unaware of their inferences, however, they are aware 
that they make inferences. Even when they fail to distinguish their conclusions 
from their premises, they understand, in principle, the distinction between these. 
Preschool children, in contrast, are not just unaware of particular inferences 
but seem unaware of inference itself. They don’t simply lose track of what they 
have inferred from what; they fail to make a distinction between premises and 
conclusions. The difference is not that very young children are unable to make 
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inferences or even that they are less likely than adults to do so. The difference 
is that very young children are unaware of inferential processes, both their own 
and those of others, and thus fail to distinguish the output of such processes 
from the input. 
By age 6, however, children recognize inference as a potential source of 
knowledge for both themselves and others (Keenan, Ruffman, & Olson, 1994; 
Miller, Hardin, & Montgomery, 2003; Pillow, 1999, 2002; Pillow, Hill, Boyce, 
& Stein, 2000; Sodian & Wimmer, 1987). Sodian and Wimmer (1987) devised 
a simple but revealing methodology for assessing young children’s awareness 
of inference. Imagine that you are presented with a container of red balls. A ball 
is then removed from this container and placed in an opaque bag without your 
seeing which ball was transferred. Despite the absence of perceptual input, you 
readily infer that the ball in the bag is red. Moreover, because you are aware that 
this conclusion can be inferred, you recognize that another person who also did 
not see the transfer will make the same inference you did and will know the color 
of the ball in the bag without having seen it. 
Sodian and Wimmer presented variations on this task, including a variety of 
control tasks, to children aged 4 to 6 years. They found that children of 4 or 5 
years routinely made correct inferences about the color of the ball in the bag 
but showed no recognition that another person could infer that color. Even when 
the other person correctly indicated the color of the ball, they attributed this to 
a lucky guess. In contrast, 6-year-olds not only made the correct inference but 
recognized that the other person would make the same inference and thus, de-
spite not having seen the ball in the bag, would know its color. In a variation 
of the task involving nonidentical objects in the original container, moreover, 6-
year-olds recognized that the other person would not be able to infer the color of 
the transferred object. Even though they themselves had seen and thus knew the 
color of the transferred object, they understood that the other person would not 
have that knowledge. 
Even the 4-year-olds in Sodian and Wimmer’s study, however, understood 
that perception could be a source of knowledge—that a person who had seen the 
transferred ball would know its color even if they themselves did not. This re-
sult is consistent with extensive research on early theories of mind showing that 
preschool children, beginning at age 4, understand that what a person knows is 
a function of what the person has seen, and that people with different perceptual 
access may thus have different beliefs, including false beliefs (Mitchell & Riggs, 
2002). Although it has been suggested that children as young as age 4 also have 
some awareness of inference as a source of knowledge (Keenan et al., 1994), 
the evidence for this is open to serious question (Pillow, 1999). Most subsequent 
research has confi rmed that awareness of inference begins to be seen at age 6, 
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and there is evidence that even 6-year-olds are sometimes oblivious to inferences 
recognized by older children. Awareness of inference apparently emerges about 
age 6, later than what is commonly called “theory of mind”, and continues to de-
velop through the childhood years (Beal, 1990; Miller et al., 2003; Pillow, 1999, 
2002; Pillow et al., 2000). 
Awareness of inference allows one to consider the possibility that some infer-
ences are better than others, in the epistemic sense that the conclusions they gen-
erate are more justifi able. In a series of two experiments, Pillow (2002) presented 
sets of inference-related tasks to 112 children, ranging in age from 5 to 10 years, 
and to 16 college undergraduates. The tasks included deductive inference, induc-
tive inference, guessing on the basis of partial information, and pure guessing. 
Children of all ages, as well as adults, were highly certain of their conclusions in 
the case of deductive inferences and less certain in the case of nondeductive in-
ferences and guesses. Even the youngest children (ages 5–6) had signifi cantly 
more confi dence in deductions than in guesses and justifi ed their deductive con-
clusions by referring to relevant premises. By ages 8–10, children had signifi -
cantly more confi dence in deduction than induction and signifi cantly more con-
fi dence in induction than in pure guessing. Adults showed a clear hierarchy with 
certainty signifi cantly higher for deductive than for inductive inferences, for in-
ductive inferences than for informed guesses, and for informed guesses than for 
pure guesses. Related research is consistent with the conclusion that children 
have at least some intuition of the greater certainty associated with deduction as 
early as age 5 or 6, but that understanding of various metalogical distinctions—
deduction versus induction, inference versus guessing, informed versus pure 
guessing—continues to develop across childhood and beyond (Galotti, Komatsu, 
& Voeltz, 1997; Pillow et al., 2000). 
Deductive inferences are not just better than nondeductive inferences in the 
sense of allowing a somewhat higher level of certainty, however. In the case of a 
deductive inference, the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. Mo-
tivated initially by the centrality of necessity in Piaget’s (1987, 2001) theory 
(Smith, 1993), there has been substantial research on the development of concep-
tions of necessity. Miller, Custer, and Nassau (2000), for example, interviewed 
100 children of ages 7, 9, and 11 about logical necessities (e.g., a light must be 
on or not on), mathematical necessities (e.g., 3 is bigger than 2), defi nitional ne-
cessities (e.g., triangles have three sides), physical laws (e.g., letting a pencil go 
will result in it falling), social conventions (e.g., students wear shoes in school), 
and an arbitrary fact (whether there was chalk in a particular box). Questions fo-
cused on spatial universality (“Is this true everywhere?”), changeability (“Could 
this ever change?”), and the imaginability of any alternative (including, for a 
sample of items, a request to draw an alternative such as “a triangle that does 
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not have three sides”). Even the 7-year-olds showed some appreciation of neces-
sary truths as holding everywhere and never changing. With increasing age, chil-
dren made increasingly sophisticated differentiations among the various sorts of 
knowledge and increasingly recognized that violations of necessary truths were 
literally unimaginable. 
Other research has generated results consistent with this picture. Children 
show some understanding of logical necessity, consistency, and impossibility 
beginning about age 6 (Ruffman, 1999; Somerville, Hadkinson, & Greenberg, 
1979; Tunmer, Nesdale, & Pratt, 1983). Research also shows continuing devel-
opment in the comprehension of necessity, possibility, suffi ciency, indetermi-
nacy, and associated concepts over the remaining years of childhood (Byrnes & 
Beilin, 1991; Morris & Sloutsky, 2001; Piaget, 1987; Pieraut-Le Bonniec, 1980; 
Ricco, 1997; Ricco, McCollum, & Wang, 1997), and age-related constraints on 
the ability to learn such concepts (Klahr & Chen, 2003). 
Not surprisingly, the development of metalogical understanding continues into 
adolescence. Consider the following arguments, each consisting of two premises 
and a conclusion: 
1. Elephants are plants or animals.
Elephants are not plants.
Therefore, elephants are animals.
2. Elephants are animals or plants.
Elephants are not animals.
Therefore, elephants are plants.
Even a young child would readily endorse the fi rst argument as logical. Children 
as old as age 9 or 10, however, reject arguments such as #2 as illogical (Mosh-
man & Franks, 1986). Most adolescents and adults, on the other hand, especially 
given suffi cient opportunity to consider their responses, recognize in cases of this 
sort that the two arguments have the same logical form and are both valid. The 
second argument has a false second premise and a false conclusion, which is why 
children reject it, but it is nonetheless a valid argument in that the conclusion fol-
lows necessarily from the two premises. If the premises were true, the conclusion 
would necessarily be true as well. 
This age difference does not refl ect an inability of children with regard to par-
ticular logical forms. Very young children routinely make instantaneous deduc-
tions without even realizing they have done so. But that’s precisely the prob-
lem. Lacking awareness of inference, they cannot explicitly evaluate arguments. 
Even as children gain some degree of awareness of and control over their in-
ferences, they initially remain oblivious to the logical form of those inferences. 
They make disjunctive inferences, for example, without explicit awareness of 
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the logical form of disjunctive arguments. Lacking explicit awareness of logi-
cal form, children do not distinguish form from content and thus remain centered 
on immediate inferences from empirically acceptable propositions (see Harris & 
Leevers, 2000, for research on counterfactual inference in young children, and 
Simoneau & Markovits, 2003, for research on the complexities of subsequent 
development). 
As children approach adolescence they increasingly distinguish form from 
content, and thus can recognize valid arguments even in the case of arguments 
containing false premises and/or a false conclusion (Morris, 2000). At relatively 
advanced levels of metalogical understanding, typically beginning about age 11, 
it becomes possible to recognize and evaluate the logical interconnections among 
propositions that are hypothetical or even false (Efklides, Demetriou, & Metal-
lidou, 1994; Franks, 1996, 1997; Markovits & Bouffard-Bouchard, 1992; Mar-
kovits & Nantel, 1989; Markovits & Vachon, 1989; Moshman & Franks, 1986). 
As a result, adolescents and adults are able to consider the potential interrelations 
of multiple possibilities and thus to formulate and test explicit theories (Inhelder 
& Piaget, 1958; Kuhn, Amsel, & O’Loughlin, 1988; Moshman, 1998, in press-a; 
Zimmerman, 2000). 
Even in early childhood, then, automatic inferences are routine. In middle 
childhood there is awareness of, and increasing knowledge about, inference. Ad-
olescents and adults, notwithstanding their many shortcomings, routinely show 
systematic forms of hypothetico-deductive reasoning not seen in children under 
the age of about 11. Is there still another stage, attained at least by some logi-
cians, involving perhaps an explicit conception of logic as an epistemic domain, 
a mode of justifi cation? Whether or not there is such a stage, or any highest stage, 
each stage in the sequence represents an advance in consciousness and control of 
logic, and thus a higher level of rationality than the stage from which it emerged.
 
UNIVERSALITY AND DIVERSITY
Piaget famously posited a universal sequence of stages culminating in a univer-
sal state of maturity—formal operations (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). In a univer-
salist stage model such as Piaget’s, each stage can only emerge from the previ-
ous one, and the limitations of each stage, if they are ever to be understood, can 
only be understood from the perspective of the next, so development proceeds in 
a predictable sequence, with the highest stage defi ning the state of maturity. Indi-
viduals may differ in the rate and extent of development, but development, to the 
extent that it occurs, can only proceed along a single path. 
Research on the development of metalogical understanding suggests a pic-
ture consistent with a universalist stage model. Preschool children make infer-
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ences but are not aware of doing so. Beginning at about age 6, children become 
aware of inference, increasingly understand that some inferences are better than 
others, increasingly recognize the necessity of deductive inferences, and increas-
ingly comprehend associated forms of necessity, possibility, and impossibility. 
Beginning at about age 11, at least some individuals attain a more explicit under-
standing of the role of logical form in guaranteeing the validity of deductive ar-
guments and show increasingly systematic reasoning with hypothetical and false 
premises. The three stages run parallel, in important ways, to Piaget’s preopera-
tional, concrete operations, and formal operations stages, and it seems plausible 
that they form an invariant sequence. That is, children make inferences before 
they come to understand the logical properties of inferences, and they understand 
those properties before they apply such metalogical understanding in hypothet-
ical contexts. Moshman (1990) provides a metacognitive account of such a se-
quence, including a fourth stage that refl ects on the third from the standpoint of 
a logician. 
As we have seen, however, logical inferences are not the only legitimate in-
ferences. Rationality includes metacognitive knowledge and control of a variety 
of inferences. Rationality is thus much richer than logic, and its development can 
be expected to be more diverse. 
Many theorists have suggested that human inferential processes are usefully 
construed as comprising two fundamental systems (Evans, 2002; Kahneman, 
2003; Klaczynski, 2000, 2001, in press; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 1999; Sta-
novich & West, 2000). Although the distinction between the systems can be, 
and has been, formulated in a variety of ways, one system is generally seen as 
analytical, involving the strict application of logic and other mechanistic sys-
tems of formal rules, and the other as heuristic, involving processes that are as-
sociative, holistic, fl exible, and sensitive to context. The distinction between 
two inferential systems raises questions about the locus of diversity. One pos-
sibility is that some groups of people are oriented towards analytic process-
ing and other groups towards heuristic processing. Another possibility is that 
individuals differ in this regard but that such differences exist mostly within, 
rather than across, abstract social groups. A third possibility is that inferen-
tial diversity exists mostly within, rather than across, individuals. Diversity, in 
other words, may exist primarily across groups, across individuals, or within 
individuals. 
Theorists of group differences fall into two categories—those highlight-
ing culture and those highlighting gender. Cultural difference theorists construe 
current evidence as showing categorical distinctions in inference, thinking, and 
reasoning across discrete cultural groups (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 
2001; Peng & Nisbett, 1999). Nisbett et al. (2001, p. 291, italics in original), for 
example, 
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. . . fi nd East Asians to be holistic, attending to the entire fi eld and assigning causal-
ity to it, making relatively little use of categories and formal logic, and relying on “di-
alectical” reasoning, whereas Westerners are more analytic, paying attention primarily 
to the object and the categories to which it belongs and using rules, including formal 
logic, to understand its behavior. The 2 types of cognitive processes are embedded in 
different naive metaphysical systems and tacit epistemologies. 
Interestingly, this distinction parallels one commonly made by some feminist 
theorists with regard to what they see as a categorical distinction between male 
and female reasoning. Construing logic as masculine, gender difference theo-
rists have argued that the equation of rationality with logic is central to the op-
pression of women because men, who tend to be logical, are thereby deemed ra-
tional, whereas women, who tend towards inferential processes that are more 
holistic, fl exible, and contextual, are thereby deemed less rational (Oliver, 1991; 
Orr, 1995). Given the existence of males and females in all cultures, it is unclear 
how the positions of the cultural difference theorists and the gender difference 
theorists can be reconciled. For the most part these two subcategories of group 
difference theorists appear unaware of each other and do not address each oth-
er’s views. 
Claims of categorical group differences in inferential processes can turn out to 
be false if research shows there is really only one mode of processing—for ex-
ample, if seemingly heuristic inferences always turn out to be logical after all. 
However, even when the inferential diversity is real—as it seems in this case to 
be—there are two ways in which claims of categorical group differences can turn 
out to be wrong. With regard to the standard analytic vs. heuristic dichotomy, one 
possibility is that there are indeed some people who can be deemed analytical/
formal thinkers and others who can be deemed heuristic/contextual thinkers, but 
that both types of people are commonly found in the various groups alleged to be 
categorically different. Another possibility is that both modes of processing are 
common in most or all people. In this case, although we can still distinguish two 
types of thinking, a distinction between two types of thinkers is more misleading 
than helpful. 
Research supports the latter possibility. Both analytic/formal and heuristic/
contextual processes are commonly seen in most or all people (Evans, 2002; 
Klaczynski, 2000, 2001, in press; Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 2000). 
There are indeed individual differences in the use of these processes, and some 
of these differences may be related to culture and/or gender, but neither East 
Asians, Westerners, women, nor men have been shown to rely on any particu-
lar kind of reasoning to the exclusion of any other kind. On the contrary, studies 
of thinking and reasoning routinely fail to fi nd gender differences (Klaczynski, 
2001), and even where cultural differences are found (Nisbett et al., 2001; Peng 
& Nisbett, 1999) they are virtually never categorical. Both analytic and heuris-
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tic processes are routine in most or all women and most or all men in most or all 
cultural contexts. 
Inferential diversity, moreover, may be too rich to capture in a simple distinc-
tion between analytic and heuristic processes, or any other dichotomy. Moshman 
(1998) distinguished three forms of reasoning—case-based, law-based, and dia-
lectical. This can be transformed into four by dividing case-based reasoning into 
(a) analogical reasoning, in which previous cases serve heuristic purposes, as in 
solving a problem by considering the solution to a similar one, and (b) precedent-
based reasoning, in which earlier determinations constrain the legitimacy of later 
ones, as in the resolution of legal disputes in a system of case law. We can gen-
erate fi ve categories of reasoning if we also subdivide law-based reasoning into 
(a) ruled-based reasoning, in which thinking is constrained by formal rules such 
as those of logic and mathematics, and (b) principled reasoning, in which think-
ing is constrained by abstract principles such as those associated with advanced 
moral understanding (Moshman, in press-b). Dialectical reasoning, in turn, takes 
multiple forms that can be sorted into any number of additional categories. Many 
researchers and theorists, moreover, see thinking as an ongoing interchange of 
multiple strategies which vary over time (Kuhn, Garcia-Mila, Zohar, & Ander-
sen, 1995; Siegler, 1996). 
How many domains of inference or types of thinking or forms of reason-
ing are there? No matter how we put the question, there is no right answer. The 
impossibility of a right answer should not deter us from trying to develop tax-
onomies and theories of thinking and reasoning, but we should be wary of as-
sumptions that there are precisely two kinds of thinking, or any other particular 
number. 
In sum, research on thinking and reasoning demonstrates diversity within in-
dividuals, diversity of a suffi ciently subtle sort that it cannot be reduced to some 
small number of defi nitive categories. This picture has important implications 
for understanding (a) human universality, (b) the process of thinking, and (c) the 
process of development. 
Classic notions of universality, based on a universal logic that defi nes ratio-
nality, do not deny the possibility of erroneous inferential processes but are chal-
lenged by the existence of legitimate inferential diversity. It does not appear that 
Piaget’s conception of formal operations, or any other logical structure, consti-
tutes rational maturity. Interestingly, however, the fact that we all use diverse 
strategies and perspectives renders human diversity a human universal. Inferen-
tial diversity, it turns out, is a universal characteristic of human rationality. 
Attention to internal diversity—the diversity within each of us—is important 
to understanding processes of thinking and development. Thinking, it appears, is 
not the deliberate application of the one true logic but rather involves the coor-
dination of distinct inferential processes. Given the demands of such coordina-
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tion, it is to be expected that we would each, perhaps to varying degrees, develop 
metacognitive understanding and control of our diverse inferences. 
The development of rationality, then, is not a matter of switching over from 
one sort of inferential system to another, as in a transition from heuristic to ana-
lytic processing. Rather it is a matter of increasing consciousness and control of 
multiple inferential processes, as in the coordination of heuristic and analytic pro-
cessing. We are now prepared to consider developmental processes more directly. 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF RATIONALITY
How do we come to be rational? As we have seen, far from being its culmina-
tion, logic comes early in the development of rationality. By the age of 4, if not 
earlier, children routinely make logically correct verbal inferences. Increasingly 
sophisticated forms of logic can be identifi ed, in fact, in the sensorimotor coordi-
nations of infancy (Langer, 1980, 1986; Piaget, 1936/1963). 
The transition from inference to reasoning, as we have seen, is not a transition 
from illogical inference to logical inference or from heuristic inference to ana-
lytic inference. Rather it is the development of increasingly explicit knowledge 
of properties implicit in the variety of inferences we already make. Novelty re-
sides not in facts or skills that emerge from genes or are taken in from environ-
ments, but rather in emerging conceptual knowledge about inferential abilities 
we already had. It seems likely, then, that progress in reasoning and rationality 
comes about through refl ection on our inferences. Such refl ection, for example, 
might enable an individual to determine that a particular inference is logically 
necessary because there is only one possible conclusion, and further refl ection 
may enable the formulation of a more general coordination of necessity and pos-
sibility (Piaget, 1987). 
If the only legitimate inferences were those sanctioned by a particular logi-
cal system, ideal reasoning might consist simply of assimilating premises to that 
system. As we have seen, however, thinking and reasoning involve the coordina-
tion of diverse inferences. Refl ection on reasoning, then, must include refl ection 
on such coordinations, and may generate knowledge that facilitates and improves 
future coordinations. Thus the development of rationality is as much a process of 
coordination as a process of refl ection, and these cannot be sharply distinguished 
(Piaget, 1985, 2001). 
Refl ection and coordination, moreover, often take place in the context of so-
cial interaction, and especially peer interaction. In social contexts we may fi nd 
ourselves challenged to justify our conclusions, and thus to recognize and justify 
our inferences. We may also be challenged to understand the inferential paths 
that led others to alternative views, and to coordinate those inferences and con-
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clusions with ours. Thus social interaction may substantially encourage processes 
of refl ection and coordination. 
Not all social interactions promote rationality, however. If the interacting in-
dividuals differ in knowledge, authority, or power (as in child/adult, student/
teacher, and novice/expert interactions), the lower-status individual may simply 
accept the conclusions of the higher-status individual with little or no refl ection 
on or coordination of inferential processes. Thus the kind of social interaction 
most likely to promote the construction of rationality may be peer interaction—
ideally, interaction among individuals who are, and see themselves to be, compa-
rable in knowledge, authority, and power. 
Processes of refl ection and coordination in the context of peer interaction are 
illustrated in a study by Moshman and Geil (1998) in which college students 
were presented with the original and most diffi cult version of the notorious se-
lection task, which requires logical testing of an abstract hypothesis. Consis-
tent with previous research, only 3 of the 32 students who worked individually 
correctly determined what evidence to seek. In sharp contrast, 15 out of the 20 
groups of fi ve or six students each who worked collaboratively made correct se-
lections, even in cases where no member of a group initially gave the logical re-
sponse, and individual members of these groups generally understood why their 
fi nal selections were correct. Close examination of what happened within the 
groups showed a process of collaborative reasoning in which students presented, 
justifi ed, criticized, compared, and combined a variety of ideas and possibilities 
until they achieved a structure of logical understanding that most or all members 
of the group understood and accepted. 
In sum, the construction of rationality involves ongoing processes of refl ec-
tion, coordination, and peer interaction (Moshman 1998, in press-a; Piaget, 1985, 
2001). These generate progress towards higher levels of metacognitive under-
standing and control of our inferential processes, but they do not culminate in 
any fi nal logical structure. Whatever level of rationality we attain, further re-
fl ection on and coordination of our current skills and insights can enhance our 
(meta)rationality. 
This is a constructivist view of the development of rationality in that it re-
lies not on genetic or environmental forces but on self-regulated processes of re-
fl ection and coordination. Like Piaget’s theory and other developmental versions 
of constructivism, the present view highlights the rationality of the constructive 
processes and their success in generating progress towards higher levels of ratio-
nality. Unlike Piaget’s theory, however, the present view does not assume a uni-
versal sequence of general stages or a universal structure that constitutes matu-
rity. Thus the present approach represents what I have elsewhere called pluralist 
rational constructivism (Moshman, in press-a). 
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THE UBIQUITY OF INFERENCE
Developmental theories are theories of progress and thus highlight the ways we 
get better—more logical, more rational, or something of that sort. For a full view 
of human functioning, however, it is important to keep in mind that not every-
thing changes, and that not all changes are good. Even as our abilities to think 
and reason improve with age, we continue throughout our lives to be driven by 
inferences beyond our present knowledge and control. Genetic considerations 
may be important in some cases, as in the universal human capacity for inferring 
emotions from the sight of human facial expressions. Cultural considerations, 
such as being indoctrinated in the ways and/or beliefs of a religious, political, or 
other group, may also drive systems of automatic inference and block ideolog-
ically unacceptable inferences. Even as we construct beliefs and values of our 
own, self-serving biases direct our inferences to avoid confl ict with our identities 
(Klaczynski, 1997, 2000; Klaczynski & Narasimham, 1998; Moshman, 2004). 
With development we become conscious of some of our inferences and better 
control our beliefs and self-conceptions. Progress is always possible through re-
fl ection, coordination, and peer interaction, but we can never fully conceptualize 
and control our inferences. Even as we become conscious of the basis for some 
set of inferences, that consciousness itself generates new inferences of which we 
are not (yet) conscious. 
Thinking and reasoning always arise in the context of diverse systems of in-
ference that are deeply biological, cultural, and self-serving. Even as we progress 
towards greater rationality, thinking and reasoning remain just the tip of an infer-
ential iceberg. Logic is elementary, and further development achievable, but ra-
tional maturity forever eludes us. 
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